ARTICLES

 

Transitional Justice in Anglophone Cameroon: Perspectives and Lessons from South Africa and Rwanda

 

 

DT Cho

North-West University, South Africa. Email: choderrickteneng@yahoo.com

 

 

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ABSTRACT

Since the fall of 2016 Anglophone Cameroon has endured the stench of an internal political conflict between security forces and separatist militia groups, in which numerous human rights violations have been committed. Given the magnitude of these violations, they have been categorised as serious crimes in international law (crimes against humanity). While international law urges the prosecution of perpetrators, this paper acknowledging the rule of law as a relevant tool in transforming and shaping societies, but the responses of states in post-conflict scenarios are not always influenced by the rule of law as they sometimes involve factors that have no legal bearing or backing. These responses have been recognised generally to constitute components of transitional justice. This paper thus views transitional justice as comprising all the measures which states usually turn to in search of ways to respond to past atrocities, whether legal, non-legal or a combination thereof. This paper argues that the situation in Anglophone Cameroon has reached unprecedented levels of violence, and given the degree of victimisation and mayhem caused to society there is a need for transitional justice in order to give closure to victims and restore stability. To suggest the form such transitional justice may take, the paper uses a comparative methodological approach in examining the transitional justice perspectives of South Africa and Rwanda, to assess what lessons could be drawn from them in respect of how they dealt with their legacies of past abuses. The paper recommends the establishment of an Anglophone Cameroon Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (ACTJRC).

Keywords: Transitional justice; human rights violations; Anglophone Cameroon crisis; truth and reconciliation commission; criminal prosecution.

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1 Introduction

In the aftermath of violent conflicts (usually non-international in nature) involving heinous human rights violations, the decision concerning the type(s) of mechanisms to be designed to address past atrocities is usually one of great importance for future generations. While criminal trials, for example, have for decades been the most frequently advocated choice of responses (the rule of law way), they have often been viewed as posing a threat to such fragile democracies at this stage of their recovery.¹

Transitional societies² usually resort to mechanisms that suit their context, and these mechanisms have not always been limited to those supported by the rule of law. Such mechanisms may be retributive (such as criminal prosecutions and punishment); restorative (such as truth commissions, reparations, institutional reforms, and even amnesties, blanket or conditional); or a combination thereof. Admittedly, the issues that ensue times of conflict transcend legal boundaries. Applying only legal mechanisms might thus be prejudicial to the needs of post-conflict societies. Under international law, however, the trend has been to move away from blanket amnesties, which do not leave room for individual criminal responsibility. Conditional amnesties, on the other hand, are given some degree of consideration. They are often the price paid for finding out the truth about what happened and the whereabouts of victims.

In the hope of initiating a conversation on "transitional justice in Anglophone Cameroon", this paper, using a comparative methodological approach, examines the transitional justice perspectives of South Africa and Rwanda, seeking to identify lessons that could be learned from their experiences in terms of mechanisms and how they could help Cameroon come to terms with the situation in Anglophone Cameroon. It considers the transitional mechanisms of these countries for a couple of reasons. Firstly, they constitute the most prominent situations of gross human rights violations in Africa whereafter concrete measures were taken to address past injustices. Secondly, the two countries applied different mechanisms. While South Africa adopted a restorative approach, Rwanda used a retributive approach to transitional justice. Cameroon could well learn from their distinct approaches. In addition, there are contextual similarities in all three contexts. All of them have colonial histories and minority and majority factions in the population. Also, there are two conflicting factions in all three contexts and there is animosity between them.³

While this paper does not advocate the replication of the South African and Rwandan transitional justice models in Cameroon, it nonetheless strongly holds that these models convey incredible lessons that Cameroon can learn from. Also, aspects of these two models, such as truth-seeking, reparation and memorialisation (from the South African model), and prosecutions (from the Rwandan model) may well be incorporated, or better still taken into consideration when coining a transitional justice response to the situation in Anglophone Cameroon.

At this point it must be acknowledged that while the Anglophone crisis is geographically limited to the Anglophone regions, it still constitutes a national problem pitting the two main factions of the country (the Anglophone population and the Francophone-led government) against each other. Just as in the cases of South Africa involving the Whites against the Blacks, and Rwanda involving the Hutus against the Tutsis, the Anglophone crisis presents a plethora of evidence upon which to view the Anglophone-Francophone rift. The Anglophone crisis as such is not limited to the Anglophone regions exclusively, given the complex national ramifications it poses, as it involves all factions of the Cameroon population even if it predominantly affects Anglophone regions. It remains a national crisis, although it is geographically limited to the English-speaking regions. To view it as a regional crisis not deserving full national attention would be a rather myopic position to take. This is why the transitional models of South Africa and Rwanda, which were nation-wide, may well be drawn from to inform the process of a transitional justice response to the Anglophone crisis.

This paper therefore suggests that there are valuable lessons to be learned from the South African and Rwandan transitional justice models that could help Cameroon in her quest for transitional justice. Although the situation in Anglophone Cameroon is ongoing, it is nevertheless relevant to suggest that pre-emptive conversations should take place on how the crisis could best be put to rest.

To put things into perspective, the paper begins by painting a picture of the Anglophone Cameroon transitional context and its evolution to the condition where a conversation on transitional justice has become inevitable. It then goes further to give a brief understanding of the notion of transitional justice before proceeding to examine the transitional justice models of South Africa and Rwanda and the lessons they offer.

 

2 The Anglophone Cameroon transitional context: A case for transitional justice

The current Anglophone crisis in Cameroon, which started in 2016, was initially grounded in the grievances of teachers and lawyers in the English-speaking (Anglophone) regions (the North West and the South West), who took to the streets to protest against a perceived marginalisation and assimilation of their much cherished, colonially inherited Anglo-Saxon educational and common law legal systems.⁴

When this happened most Anglophone people quickly identified with these grievances as they were akin to the long-standing common grievances and challenges of the larger Anglophone population. As a result, prominent Anglophone pressure groups such as the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) and the Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL), which had previously led the agenda for a return to federalism or secession⁵ but had been brutally suppressed and forced to go underground,⁶ took advantage of the situation to mobilise the Anglophone people into resurrecting calls for federalism and secession.⁷

The government's repressive tactics further exacerbated the antagonism, fostering the idea among some Anglophones that a two-state federation or secession would be the best option.⁸ Undoubtedly this led to the escalation of the crisis, with the emergence of separatist militia groups, including inter alia the Ambazonian Defence Forces (ADF), the Southern Cameroons Defence Forces (SOCADEF) and the Lebialem Red Dragons, who are often referred to by the general Anglophone population as the "Amba boys".⁹Since their emergence they have adopted both a defensive and an offensive stance against the government's security forces, comprising of the army, the gendarmes and other paramilitary units like the Rapid Intervention Battalion (generally referred to by its French acronym: BIR), as well as the police.¹⁰ In addition, in a bid to implement their various dissident strategies, including ghost town operations and boycotts, they have attacked anyone (civilians) who appears to be disobedient to or unsupportive of their mission.¹¹ They aim to achieve a new political order by force if necessary, their goals being either federation or the secession of Anglophone Cameroon to form a country on its own, which they call "Ambazonia", a name that was coined and used first by Gorji Dinka.¹² Meanwhile the government is bent on maintaining the political status quo of the country as a unitary state.

Both camps have committed acts of political violence that have resulted in abuses of the civilian population of Anglophone communities.¹³ Civilian objects and populations have reportedly been targeted. The Anglophone population has been the victim,¹⁴ suffering numerous human rights violations, including inter alia mass arbitrary arrests and detentions, arson and the vandalism of local communities. The abuses include mass displacements, extra-judicial killings, abductions, sexual violence and mutilations, torture and other cruel, inhumane acts.¹⁵ In addition, the population has suffered from curfews, lockdowns, the restriction of movement, extortion and the destruction of schools, with the effect of terminating education for many learners.¹⁶ To mention just a few effects of this crisis, one may refer to the loss of lives (over 3,000 individuals, predominantly civilians); the forced displacement of more than 500,000 people (Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)) into nearby regions,¹⁷ with many others seeking refuge in the forest lands of rural areas which are generally difficult to access, where they live in makeshift shelters; and the flight of over 50,000 refugees into neighbouring Nigeria.¹⁸ There has also been an increase in crime, which is evident in the armed robberies, looting, kidnapping, hijacking and mutilations being committed by individuals who claim to belong to the "Ambazonia movement" as well as by criminal gangs.¹⁹ As a corollary, the socio-economic life of the two Anglophone Regions has been greatly disrupted.

Unfortunately, no concrete moves have been made toward holding perpetrators accountable or compensating victims to ensure non-repetition.²⁰ There is thus a need for transitional justice to bring healing, restore peace and stability and re-establish a common ground for peaceful coexistence among all members of Cameroonian society (Anglophones and Francophones alike).

Two factors have been identified as constituting the major reasons why the Anglophone Cameroon situation might be deserving of transitional justice. These factors also suggest the sui generis nature of the conflict. Firstly, due to the organised nature, the degree of victimisation and the gross human rights violations committed therein, the crisis is seen to have gone beyond normally acceptable levels of political violence.²¹ Secondly, this is the first time that Anglophones have taken up arms against the government in such a manner as to resist the same grievances that they had in the past addressed through diplomatic approaches. It seems in this instance that "the argument of force" had succeeded "the force of argument", the latter of which Anglophone people had always supported.²²

 

3 The transitional justice conundrum

It is now widely accepted that transitional justice encompasses all measures that states may implement to achieve political change, and that this is characterised by legal responses to confront the crimes of the past.²³ While transitional justice for some has involved the concept of individual criminal responsibility, with the institution of criminal tribunals and the prosecution of perpetrators of past gross human rights violations, other jurisdictions, including South Africa, have based their responses to the legacy of past atrocities on other notions which seek reconciliation, forgiveness and the restoration of society. In such societies truth commissions, reparations, amnesties and different institutional reforms have often been the core transitional justice mechanisms. In some instances the rule of law and legalism have not always been the systems upon which societies have transitioned into peace and stability. Instead, other factors such as religion, tradition and the cultural beliefs of the people have often been the determinants of the type of transitional justice mechanisms to be adopted. As such, this paper views transitional justice as comprising all measures that states employ to address past atrocities and restore stability, including both legal and non-legal responses.²⁴ The African Union Transitional Justice Policy Framework recognises five mechanisms that transitional societies can adopt to address the legacies of past atrocities, namely: regional human rights litigation; domestic prosecutions; national reparations; truth telling; and community-based mechanisms.²⁵ These mechanisms echo the ideas of justice, truth, reparations and guarantees of non-repetition, which are at the core of the concept of transitional justice.

Kim and Hong have stated that the decision of transitional societies regarding what justice mechanism to utilise is determined by the outcome of the conflict or the situation.²⁶ Where there has been a one-sided victory it is easy to use prosecutorial mechanisms, as in the cases of Rwanda after the genocide, the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge atrocities, and Ethiopia,²⁷ whereas non-prosecutorial mechanisms such as truth commissions, reparations and amnesties have mostly been evident where no one party has emerged as the winner, resulting in a negotiated settlement,²⁸ like the transitions of post-apartheid South Africa and Latin America.²⁹

Should Cameroon be able to break from a past characterised by political violence and a culture of impunity, this would be contingent on the mechanisms established. The choice of such mechanisms would largely depend on knowledge of their relative success in other countries. The transitional justice models of South Africa (a non-prosecutorial model) and Rwanda (a prosecutorial model) are worth examining.

 

4 The South African transitional justice model: Amnesty for truth

Like many other countries in the last decade of the 20^th century, South Africa was confronted with the task of coming to terms with the legacy of the apartheid regime. Apartheid, unlike such racial discrimination in other countries, was characterised by its having been institutionalised and the application of violent tactics to enforce apartheid policies. Apartheid, meaning "apartness" in Afrikaans, was a policy instituted in South Africa by the National Party when it took power in 1948. The aim was to promote the supremacy of the white minority over the black majority and other races including Asians and coloured people. This policy was legalised through the enactment of a set of discriminatory laws which sought to separate whites from blacks as well as to curtail some of the basic human rights of black South Africans.³⁰ In this system blacks were discriminated against regarding the type of services, facilities as well as social and public amenities that the apartheid government provided. Whites had the best quality in terms of education, jobs, and socio-economic and infrastructural development. Additionally, the government prohibited relationships between blacks and whites, allocated separate areas for black settlement, and instituted laws (the Pass Laws) to restrict and control the movements of black people into white areas and in white facilities such as buses. These laws were used against the black population to criminalise certain conduct as well as to brutally suppress any form of dissidence with the arbitrary policies of the government.³¹

The government employed ferocious tactics in order to maintain white supremacy and enforce its policies, including arbitrary arrests, detention, torture, assassinations, forced disappearances, forced displacement, land dispossession, and other forms of racial and ethnic discrimination which constituted crimes against humanity.³² In the midst of the mayhem, liberation movements like the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement (INCLM), now the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)) emerged. Although their early strategies were nonviolent and were characterised by strike actions, boycotts, and civil disobedience, these parties later adopted violent tactics, with the ANC forming a military wing called uMkhonto we Sizwe ("Spear of the Nation") that employed violence against the apartheid government. More than four decades of apartheid, which prevailed from 1948 until 1990, involving the commission of gross human rights violations, including inter alia assassinations, kidnappings and forced disappearances, destabilised the socio-political fabric of South African society. Admittedly, the traumatic experiences of victims of injustice and inequality inflicted psychological wounds and mistrust between the whites and blacks of South Africa which are still evident to date.³³

When the struggle finally ended it became incumbent on the new, transitional government that had taken power to confront the past abuses and heal the society that had been fragmented and ripped apart by racism.³⁴They felt that if these divisions were not addressed, this could lead to vengeful violence from the blacks.³⁵

It was against this backdrop that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (the TRC or the Commission) was established, to restore and reconcile society through truth-telling rather than retribution.³⁶

4.1 The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)

Informed by the Ubuntu philosophy which celebrates the values of solidarity, humanity, social cohesion and forgiveness,³⁷ and the idea that the acknowledgment of past abuses perpetrated by the apartheid regime would foster healing and the coexistence of all peoples in the future, the TRC was established as a third-option transitional justice mechanism (a "third way" in the often-cited words of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the Chair of the TRC) between criminal prosecutions and blanket amnesties.³⁸

The purpose of the TRC was to promote national unity and reconciliation in a way that surpassed the differences of the past, according to the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. The South African transitional justice model spearheaded by the TRC had as its mandate the following: To establish through investigations and hearings "as complete a picture as possible" of the root causes, context as well as perspectives of both victims and perpetrators of the human rights violations of the apartheid regime committed from the period of March 1960 to May 1994;³⁹ to facilitate the granting of amnesties to those responsible for the commission of politically motivated crimes who made "full disclosure" of the facts and political motives behind the commission of such crimes;⁴⁰ to compile a comprehensive report of the outcomes; to restore the dignity of victims by allowing them to tell their own stories of the violations they suffered and recommend reparation measures for victims; and to propose measures that would help prevent the recurrence of violence.⁴¹

As a result of this extensive mandate, the TRC was divided into three committees: the Human Rights Violations Committee; the Amnesty Committee; and the Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee.⁴² These committees were assisted by an Investigation Unit and a Research Department.⁴³ Through these committees, the work of the TRC was made manifest.

Under the Human Rights Violations Committee, hearings were held where victims and their families could share their stories of human rights violations and receive support and sympathy.⁴⁴ In some cases hostility was also provoked.⁴⁵ The Amnesty Committee allowed perpetrators to apply for amnesty provided they complied with the requirements (full disclosure, including of the political motive).⁴⁶ Shocking confessions were made by perpetrators during these hearings.⁴⁷ Some even demonstrated how they had tortured their victims.⁴⁸ This evoked emotional responses as the survivors were reminded of their traumatic experiences. It is argued that the legalistic nature of the hearings might also have constrained the amnesty hearings and restricted the amount of truth revealed therein.⁴⁹

The Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee made recommendations for reparations and awarded the victims monetary compensation,⁵⁰ directed social and health services towards the victims, awarded them education subsidies, and instigated institutional reforms to help victims move on from the atrocities they had suffered and to ensure non-recurrence.⁵¹ Symbolic reparations and memorialisation through the naming of public places and the erection of statues also played a significant role in terms of reparation in post-apartheid South Africa. A good example is the Cradock Four Memorial, a monument erected in honour of four anti-apartheid activists (namely: Fort Calata, Mathew Goniwe, Sicelo Mhlauli, and Sparrow Mkhonto) assassinated by the Apartheid police on 27 June 1985.⁵² Other apartheid-related memorials include inter alia Robben Island in Cape Town, the Bhisho Massacre Memorial in Bhisho, and the Langa Memorial in Uitenhage. Also public spaces in South Africa including hospitals, universities, and gardens have been named after some of the leaders of the struggle against Apartheid. Some examples include the Nelson Mandela University in Gqeberha (formerly Port Elizabeth), the Steve Biko Academic Hospital in Pretoria, and the Walter Sisulu Botanical Garden in Johannesburg.

Irrespective of its contribution to reforming South African society, the TRC was not without weaknesses.

One of the weaknesses had to do with the fact that the TRC did not address and settle key issues relating to apartheid such as racial segregation and the dispossession of land.⁵³ The failure to address these issues has contributed to the ongoing problem of racism and land dispossession in South Africa today, with the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), a leading opposition party, unflinchingly pushing the agenda for "the expropriation of land without compensation".⁵⁴

Additionally, although the TRC's offer of amnesty motivated truth-telling and gave closure to the families of victims about the whereabouts of their families, it was criticised for granting amnesty to perpetrators of gross human rights violations, which was viewed as unacceptable under international law⁵⁵ and as fostering impunity in South Africa.⁵⁶ At the end of its work the TRC handed over hundreds of cases to the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) for investigation and possible prosecution. 30 years later nothing substantial has been done in that regard.⁵⁷ Many South Africans feel that those who committed heinous crimes should have been prosecuted and punished. This was demonstrated in some key cases.⁵⁸This delay may well be viewed as a denial of justice, as the saying goes "justice delayed, is justice denied". Technically this reveals the failures of the NPA and the government.

Despite the weaknesses of the TRC, its role in making South Africa a more inclusive space for all to thrive in is undeniable. It has thus gained global recognition as the model truth commission that other countries tend to emulate.

4.2 Lessons from South Africa

Given the role of the South African TRC in restoring society, this paper suggests that establishing a truth commission in Anglophone Cameroon would go a long way toward achieving resilience, tolerance and social cohesion, and might foster a safe atmosphere for all factions of the Cameroon population to thrive in, despite their apparent historical, sociopolitical and cultural disparities.⁵⁹ The South African transitional model stands as a good example in terms of the shared memory it established through truth-seeking, as well as its reparations scheme. Cameroon may well emulate this, as there is a need for the truth to be told, for victims to be compensated and for society to be reconciled.

Also, the symbolic aspects that fostered memorialisation (such as the renaming of public places, erecting statues and opening museums), as well as reconstruction are worth emulating.

This paper, however, discourages the granting of amnesty (even as a motivation for telling the truth) to perpetrators of the most egregious human rights violations that constitute crimes against humanity.⁶⁰

 

5 Rwanda's transitional model: Criminal prosecution

In 1994 genocide shook the very fabric of Rwandan society, leaving the world astounded as to how ethnic animosity (between the Hutus and the Tutsis) could lead to the commission of such horrendous acts of violence.⁶¹In just one hundred days about one million persons were massacred.⁶² In the aftermath of the genocide, the necessity for justice was palpable and irrefutable.⁶³ It was unanimously agreed by all stakeholders that justice was the least they could do for the victims. The question, however, was what kind of measure of justice was most appropriate.

Clearly, given the freshness of the wounds of the genocide and the cries for justice, it was unrealistic to attempt to provide justice through any means short of criminal accountability. In the circumstances, in 1996 the government decided that criminal prosecution should be pursued through the country's domestic judicial system. Although this sounded like a welcome approach, the challenge was that the genocide had destabilised most if not all of the criminal justice system of Rwanda, which even before the genocide had been as described by Schabas "a corrupt caricature of justice"⁶⁴ lacking the qualities of independence and impartiality. In addition, given the large-scale, popular participation of many persons in the genocide, which resulted in many suspects being tried, questions were raised as to whether the criminal justice system would be able to adjudicate the enormous caseload.⁶⁵

More significant was the question of whether universal accountability through criminal prosecutions alone was adequate, or whether there was a need to complement it with non-prosecutorial mechanisms.

It soon became evident that not only would the "recovering" criminal justice system be overwhelmed by the caseload, but that it also lacked the capacity, in terms of financial, material, and human resources, as well as the professional expertise to effectively deal with the legacy of the genocide.⁶⁶ Assistance was thus requested from the United Nations to try perpetrators of the genocide,⁶⁷ resulting in the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),⁶⁸ with the mandate of prosecuting and punishing those most responsible for the genocide,⁶⁹ leaving the lower-level perpetrators to be dealt with domestically.⁷⁰ It is against this backdrop that the modern Gacaca system had its genesis. Together with the ICTR, they constituted the main drivers of the Rwandan transitional justice.

5.1 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

Established in November 1994, the ICTR, was a mechanism designed to rescue the failed attempt of the Rwandan transitional government to address the legacy of the genocide through its domestic criminal justice system. In order to contribute to the restoration of social order as well as to put an end to the culture of impunity in Rwanda, the ICTR set out to prosecute

persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring states, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December.⁷¹

Several points may be advanced in considering whether the ICTR delivered justice to Rwandan society.

Firstly, the ICTR has been applauded for its role in preventing the recurrence of violence in Rwanda by punishing key perpetrators of the genocide,⁷² thereby sending a strong message to the community regarding the intolerability of such conduct and thus deterring future violence.⁷³

Secondly, the ICTR received support from the international community, which helped to locate and prosecute suspects who fled the country.⁷⁴

Thirdly, the ICTR ensured that defendants received a fair trial and protected the rights of defendants and witnesses.⁷⁵ These aspects and the observance of the directives on the assignment of defence counsels,⁷⁶ as well as the observance of the code of professional conduct,⁷⁷ gave credibility to the trials.

In addition, the ICTR set precedents in the international criminal justice system by instituting a general deterrent towards the perpetration of heinous crimes globally,⁷⁸ and also by holding accountable those responsible for heinous crimes regardless of their official status or any immunities.⁷⁹ The practice and jurisprudence of the ICTR also provided valuable lessons for the establishment and operation of the International Criminal Court, which today constitutes a milestone achievement in the international criminal justice system.⁸⁰

Despite its relevance to Rwanda and the international community, concerns have been raised concerning its inefficiency, its bureaucracy, the length of its proceedings, and its huge cost.⁸¹

A key issue raised related to the disconnectedness of the tribunal from Rwandan society. The ICTR has been criticised for taking justice far away from the people. With the seat of the tribunal being located in Arusha, Tanzania,⁸² hundreds of miles away from Rwanda, many Rwandans felt that justice had been taken out of their reach, depriving them of the satisfaction that comes from seeing justice being done. Rwandans preferred the more proximate justice demonstrated through the Gacaca courts.⁸³

5.2 Gacaca courts: Locally owned and controlled justice

Traditionally, in the pre-genocide era, Gacaca courts (Inkiko Gacaca) were small community courts used for settling family disputes.⁸⁴ In the post-genocide period the transitional government modified the Gacaca courts as a transitional justice mechanism to deal with the large number of lower-level genocidaires who were not going to be tried by the ICTR. Organic Law No 16/2004 of 2004 gave Gacaca courts jurisdiction to try perpetrators of genocide and crimes against humanity committed between the 1^st of October 1990 and the 31^st of December 1994.⁸⁵ The use of Gacaca was well-received by Rwandans as it resonated with their local communities. The challenge, however, was that traditional Gacaca courts had never before dealt with serious crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity.⁸⁶ The jurisdiction of Gacaca courts was thus amended to include some retributive elements, allowing them to pronounce penalties such as imprisonment, correctional service and community service.⁸⁷ Formal rules of evidence and criminal procedure were also incorporated into the Gacaca system,⁸⁸ giving them a combined motive of retribution and reconciliation.⁸⁹As such, the Gacaca courts may well be described as "domestic hybrid courts", given their blend of Rwandan cultural values and Western norms of criminal justice.⁹⁰

The idea of using the Gacaca system was welcomed by Rwandans as it resonated with the local communities. The challenge, however, resided in the fact that the traditional Gacaca court had never dealt with serious crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity.⁹¹ The jurisdiction of the Gacaca courts, therefore, was amended⁹² and modernised so that they could adjudicate genocide matters.⁹³ The Gacaca courts became charged with a combined mission of retribution and reconciliation, whereby an admission of guilt, confession, repentance and apology which under the traditional Gacaca courts would lead to forgiveness now served as mitigating elements in the new Gacaca system.⁹⁴

Comparatively, the Gacaca courts have received more praise in Rwandan communities than the ICTR regarding their contribution to transforming Rwandan society,⁹⁵ given their truth-telling and reparative aspects that fostered healing and prevented vengeful violence.⁹⁶

The Gacaca system disseminated a powerful message to future generations of Rwandans: forgiveness. Through the Gacaca courts, Rwandans were reminded of and remoulded in their traditional values of forgiveness and oneness, without which feelings of distrust and hatred could lead to the resurgence of violence.⁹⁷

Gacaca had its weaknesses, however. Some authors have condemned the Gacaca court system as a political tool of the transitional government used to paint the Hutus as perpetrators of genocide rather than a forum for justice for all Rwandans.⁹⁸ This rationale is based on the government's allegation that all Hutus, without exception, were guilty of genocide.⁹⁹

Furthermore, critics have raised the lack of legal training of the Gacaca judges (Inyangamugayo) as posing a legitimacy problem to the Gacaca system. The only training the judges had, was on the procedures of operating Gacaca courts.¹⁰⁰ It was unfathomable how the worst crimes in a state and even the international community could be handled professionally by persons who had no legal education or experience.¹⁰¹ One author noted that "twenty years in prison is a long time and seems more unjust when handed down by a biased or unknowledgeable judge."¹⁰²

Also detracting from the legitimacy of the Gacaca courts was the fact that a huge number of Gacaca judges were later discovered to have been involved in genocide themselves.¹⁰³ This discredited the legitimacy of the Gacaca system, causing many to lose confidence in its ability to provide justice for post-genocide Rwanda.

5.3 Lessons from Rwanda

By interrogating the transitional justice model of Rwanda, this paper holds, given the existence of discrimination in Cameroon fuelled by the actions of the Francophone-led government against Anglophones, that the crisis has the potential to escalate into genocide-like violent clashes between the Anglophones and Francophones, if not addressed.

In Rwanda discrimination against the Hutu (regarding them as low-class people as opposed to Tutsis, who were regarded as high-class people) was initiated by the Belgian colonial government. This discrimination was entrenched and emulated by Tutsi governments, which led to a Hutu revolution against Tutsis, which eventually grew into a genocide. Cameroon should therefore learn from the Rwandan experience and deal with the root causes of the Anglophone crisis in order to foster reconciliation and unity.

Furthermore the Rwandan transitional model, which utilised both international and national (local) transitional justice mechanisms, demonstrated that local justice through the Gacaca courts had a more far-reaching impact on Rwandan society than international justice delivered through the ICTR. As such, this paper suggests that Cameroon should strengthen its domestic judicial system (which is today better than that of Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide) to enable it to address the crimes committed, rather than relying on an international response. Although there is a lack of trust in the current government institutions, any international involvement should be limited to facilitating and monitoring, while maintaining local control and ownership.

Additionally, if justice through human rights prosecutions is to be served in Cameroon, the powers of judicial bodies must be restored to adjudicate on cases without government interference in order to restore citizens' confidence in the judicial system's ability to provide justice, failing which only a caricature of justice would ensue.

 

6 Conclusion

Having discussed the transitional justice perspectives of South Africa and Rwanda, this paper resolves that impunity for the human rights violations committed in the Anglophone crisis may be confronted through the institution of a transitional justice model which considers various aspects of post-conflict justice as portrayed in the South African and Rwandan responses to the atrocities committed in those countries.

It is thus submitted that, while the establishment of a truth commission would enable Cameroon to uncover the truth about the atrocities committed in the Anglophone crisis and the perpetrators thereof, as well as to interrogate the root causes of the Anglophone crisis and to offer victims the opportunity to tell their stories and claim reparations, the element of prosecution should not be overlooked. If the culture of impunity is to be eradicated and the rule of law strengthened, individuals (both state and nonstate) responsible for the worst abuses must be prosecuted and punished. It is against this backdrop that this paper recommends the establishment of an Anglophone Cameroon Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (ACTJRC) as a holistic transitional justice mechanism that combines both retributive and restorative justice techniques, in order not just to restore and reconcile society but also to make a strong statement of intolerance of impunity, thus deterring any future violence.

While this paper highlights the need for transitional justice for the situation in Anglophone Cameroon, it acknowledges the challenges that have obstructed the pursuit of justice, including the lack of political will, the lack of judicial independence, and the ongoing nature of the crisis. How to best surmount these challenges remains a matter for future research.

 

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Allan A and Allan MM "The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a Therapeutic Tool" 2000 Behavioural Science and the Law 459-477        [ Links ]

Backer D "Evaluating Transitional Justice in South Africa from a Victim's Perspective" 2005 Journal of the International Institute http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.4750978.0012.207        [ Links ]

Baines G "The Rainbow Nation? Identity and Nation Building in PostApartheid South Africa" 1998 Mots Pluriels 1-10        [ Links ]

Berrisford S "Unravelling Apartheid Spatial Planning Legislation in South Africa: A Case Study" 2011 Urban Forum 247-263        [ Links ]

Byrne CC "Benefit or Burden: Victims' Reflections on TRC Participation" 2004 Peace and Conflict 237-256        [ Links ]

Cho DT and Agbor AA "An Intra-State 'Humanitarian' Crisis in the Offing? Critical Insights into the Human Rights and Humanitarian Violations in the Ongoing Anglophone Cameroon Crisis" 2022 Journal of Nation-Building and Policy Studies 5-29        [ Links ]

Cho DT and Agbor AA "Prosecuting Human Violations Committed in the Anglophone Cameroon Crisis: A Disquisition on the Legal Framework" 2022 PELJ 1-29        [ Links ]

Crawford J "Hopes and Fears as Kigali Launches Participative Justice" Hirondelle News Agency Lausanne (11 October 2001) 2        [ Links ]

De Greiff P The Handbook of Reparations (Oxford University Press Oxford 2006)        [ Links ]

De Jonge K Interim Report on Research on Gacaca Jurisdictions and its Preparations (Penal Reform International Kigali 2001)        [ Links ]

Dinka GF "The New Social Order" in Mukong AW (ed) The Case for the Southern Cameroons (CAMFECO Washington DC 1990) 91-105        [ Links ]

Dubow S Apartheid, 1948-1994 (Oxford University Press Oxford 2014)        [ Links ]

Gahima G Transitional Justice in Rwanda: Accountability for Atrocity (Routledge London 2013)        [ Links ]

Gibson JL "The Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation: Lessons from South Africa" 2006 Journal of Conflict Resolution 409-432        [ Links ]

Graybill L and Lanegran K "Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation in Africa: Issues and Cases" 2004 African Studies Quarterly 1-8        [ Links ]

Hamber B Transforming Societies after Political Violence: Truth, Reconciliation, and Mental Health (Springer New York 2009)        [ Links ]

Ingelaere B "The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda" in Huyse L and Salter M (eds) Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning from African Experiences (International IDEA Stockholm 2008) 25-59        [ Links ]

Jablonski NG, Blum L and Friedman S The Colour of Our Future: Does Race Matter in Post-Apartheid South Africa? (New York University Press New York 2015)        [ Links ]

Jones NA The Courts of Genocide: Politics and the Rule of Law in Rwanda and Arusha (Routledge London 2010)        [ Links ]

Kaliisa S "Kigali Begins Training Judges for New Justice System in December" Internews Arusha (25 October 2001) 1        [ Links ]

Kaufman ZD and Clark P (eds) After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction, and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond (Oxford University Press 2009)        [ Links ]

Kavuro C "Rwanda Reconciliation Process: Outcome Analysis of Gacaca Courts" Unpublished contribution delivered at the Great Lakes Region Shareholders' Conference for Sustainable Peace (September 2011 Cape Town)        [ Links ]

Kavuro C "Gacaca Courts, Reconciliation and the Politics of Apology in Post-Genocide Rwanda" 2017 SACJ 38-71        [ Links ]

Kim NK and Hong MH "Politics of Pursuing Justice in the Aftermath of Civil Conflict" 2019 Journal of Conflict Resolution 1165-1192        [ Links ]

Konings P "Anglophone University Students and Anglophone Nationalist Struggles in Cameroon" in Abbink J (ed) Vanguard or Vandals Youth Politics and Conflict in Africa (Brill Leiden 2005) 163-190        [ Links ]

Konings P and Nyamnjoh FB "The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon" 1997 JMAS 207-229        [ Links ]

Legide KK "The Facets of Transitional Justice and 'Red Terror' Mass Trials of Derg Officials in Post-1991 Ethiopia: Reassessing its Achievements and Pitfalls" 2021 Journal of African Conflicts and Peace Studies 1-33        [ Links ]

Lin O "Demythologizing Restorative Justice: South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Rwanda's Gacaca Courts in Context" 2005 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 41-85        [ Links ]

Lykes MB and Mersky M "Reparations and Mental Health: Psychosocial Interventions towards Healing, Human Agency, and Rethreading Social Realities" in De Grieff P (ed) The Handbook of Reparations (Oxford University Press Oxford 2006) 589-622        [ Links ]

Malamud-Goti J "Transitional Governments in the Breach: Why Punish State Criminals?" 1990 Hum Rts Q 1-16        [ Links ]

Mibenge C "Enforcing International Humanitarian Law at the National Level: The Gacaca Jurisdictions of Rwanda" 2004 YIHL 410-424        [ Links ]

Nagy R "Traditional Justice and Legal Pluralism in Transitional Context: The Case of Rwanda's Gacaca Courts" in Quinn JR (ed) Reconciliation(s): Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies (McGill-Queen's Press Montreal 2009) 86-115        [ Links ]

Ndlovu-Gatsheni SJ and Tafira CK "The Land Question in South Africa: History of Dispossession, Political Discourse, and Post-Apartheid Government Policy" in Lumumba-Kasongo T (ed) Land Reforms and Natural Resource Conflicts in Africa: New Development Paradigms in the Era of Global Liberalization (Routledge London 2015) 135-148        [ Links ]

Ntoubandi FZ Amnesty for Crimes against Humanity under International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Leiden 2007)        [ Links ]

Orentlicher DF "Settling Accounts Revisited: Reconciling Global Norms with Local Agency" 2007 International Journal of Transitional Justice 10-22        [ Links ]

Palmer N "International Criminal Law and Border Control: The Expressive Role of the Deportation and Extradition of Genocide Suspects to Rwanda" 2020 LJIL 789-807        [ Links ]

Pineteh E "Memories of Home and Exile: Narratives of Cameroonian Asylum Seekers in Johannesburg" 2005 Journal of Intercultural Studies 379-399        [ Links ]

Pommerolle ME and Heungoup HDM "The 'Anglophone Crisis': A Tale of the Cameroonian Postcolony" 2017 African Affairs 526-538        [ Links ]

Reyntjens F "Le Gacaca ou la Justice du Gazon au Rwanda" 1990 Politique Africaine 31-41        [ Links ]

Sarkin J "The Tension between Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Politics, Human Rights, Due Process and the Role of the Gacaca Courts in Dealing with the Genocide" 2001 JAL 143-172        [ Links ]

Schabas WA "Post-Genocide Justice in Rwanda: A Spectrum of Options" in Kaufman ZD and Clark P (eds) After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction, and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond (Oxford University Press 2009) 207-227        [ Links ]

Schabas WA "National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute Genocide, the 'Crime of Crimes'" 2003 JICJ 39-63        [ Links ]

Schabas WA "Amnesty, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone" 2004 UC Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 145-169        [ Links ]

Scharf MP "Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute International Crimes in Haiti?" 1996 Tex Int'l LJ 31 1-42        [ Links ]

Stevens G "Truth, Confessions and Reparations: Lessons from the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission" 2005 African Safety Promotion 23-39        [ Links ]

Teitel R "Transitional Justice in a New Era" 2003 Fordham Int'l LJ 893-906        [ Links ]

Teitel RG "Transitional Justice Genealogy" 2003 Harv Hum Rts J 69-94        [ Links ]

Truth and Reconciliation Commission Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume 1 (The Commission Cape Town 1998)        [ Links ]

Trouille HL "France, Universal Jurisdiction and Rwandan Génocidaires: The Simbikangwa Trial" 2016 JICJ 195-217        [ Links ]

Tutu D No Future without Forgiveness (Doubleday New York 1999)        [ Links ]

Van der Merwe H and Chapman AR Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC Deliver? (University of Pennsylvania Press Philadelphia 2008)        [ Links ]

Westberg MM "Rwanda's Use of Transitional Justice after Genocide: The Gacaca Courts and the ICTR" 2010 U Kan L Rev 331-367        [ Links ]

Case law

AZAPO v Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1996 8 BCLR 1015 (CC)

The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd v McBride 2011 8 BCLR 816 (CC)

The Prosecutor v Paul Bisengimana (Judgment and Sentence) 2006 ICTR 00-60-T

The Prosecutor v Vincent Rutaganira (Judgment and Sentence) 2005 ICTR-95-1C-T

Legislation

Rwanda

Organic Law Establishing the Organisation, Competence and Functioning of Gacaca Courts Charged with Prosecuting and Trying the Perpetrators of the Crime of Genocide and Other Crimes against Humanity, Committed between October 1 1990 and December 31 1994 Organic Law No 16/2004 of 2004, as modified by Organic Law No 28/2006 of 2006

South Africa

Group Areas Act 41 of 1950

Immorality Act 23 of 1957

Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 55 of 1949

Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995

Public Safety Act 3 of 1953

Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 49 of 1953

Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950

Terrorism Act 83 of 1967

Unlawful Organisations Act 34 of 1960

International instruments

International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973)

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998)

UN Committee against Torture: Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations, South Africa UN Doc CAT/C/ZAF/CO/1 (2006)

UN Security Council Resolution 955: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda UN Doc S/RES/955 (1994)

UN Security Council Resolution 977: Designation of Arusha as the Seat of the International Tribunal for Rwanda UN Doc S/RES/977 (1995)

Internet sources

Act Alliance 2019 Life-Saving Assistance and Resilience-Building for IDPs in the Anglophone Regions of Cameroon https://reliefweb.int/report/cameroon/act-alliance-appeal-cameroon-conflict-emergency-cmr191 accessed 10 December 2019        [ Links ]

Amnesty International 2010 Safer to Stay Silent: The Chilling Effect of Rwanda's Laws on "Genocide Ideology" and "Sectarianism" https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr47/005/2010/en/ accessed 20 March 2021        [ Links ]

Amnesty International 2018 A Turn for the Worse: Violence and Human Rights Violations in Anglophone Cameroon https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR1784812018ENGLISH.PDF accessed 3 July 2019        [ Links ]

Brankovic J 2014 African Union Transitional Justice Policy Framework in Practice: Implementing Accountability Measures https://www.csvr.org.za/african-union-transitional-justice-policy-framework-in-practice-implementing-accountability-measures/ accessed 24 February 2024        [ Links ]

Cameroon-info.net 2016 Honorable Joseph Wirba: Ceux qui Affirment que le Cameroun Doit Être Divisé en Deux Ont Raison http://www.cameroon-info.net/article/cameroun-honorable-joseph-wirba-depute-du-bui-ceux-qui-affirment-que-le-cameroundoit-277266.html accessed 27 June 2020        [ Links ]

Dionne S 2018 Cameroon on a Brink of Civil War as English Speakers Recount "Unbearable" Horror https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/world/africa/cameroon-election-biya-ambazonia.html accessed 22 June 2020        [ Links ]

Human Rights Watch 2011 Justice Compromised: The Legacy of Rwanda's Community-Based Gacaca Courts https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/05/31/justice-compromised/legacy-rwandas-community-based-gacaca-courts accessed 20 March 2021        [ Links ]

Human Rights Watch 2018 "These Killings Can Be Stopped": Abuses by Government and Separatist Groups in Cameroon's Anglophone Regions https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/cameroon0718_web2.pdf accessed 27 July 2019        [ Links ]

Human Rights Watch 2019 Cameroon: New Attacks on Civilians by Troops, Separatists https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/28/cameroon-new-attacks-civilians-troops-separatists accessed 24 June 2020        [ Links ]

Human Rights Watch 2019 Cameroon: Security Forces Kill Civilians, Rape Woman https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/22/cameroon-security-forces-kill-civilians-rape-woman accessed 25 February 2024        [ Links ]

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2008 Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/directive-assignment-defence-counsel_en_fr.pdf accessed 28 May 2021        [ Links ]

International Crisis Group 2017 Cameroon's Anglophone Crisis at the Crossroads https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/250-cameroons-anglophone-crisis-at-the-crossroads_0.pdf accessed 26 July 2019        [ Links ]

Longari M 2018 Cameroon's President Vows "National Dialogue" to Ease Tensions with Anglophone Separatists https://www.france24.com/en/20190911-cameroonian-president-biya-national-dialogue-anglophone-separatists accessed 14 September 2019        [ Links ]

Merten M 2021 Land Expropriation without Compensation: Amending Constitution's Section 25 Draws to a Close - but EFF Makes Last Stand for Nationalization https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-16-amending-constitutions-section-25-draws-to-a-close-but-eff-makes-last-stand-for-nationalisation/ accessed 18 April 2021        [ Links ]

Moyo N 2022 Rhodes University Helps Brings History to the Present through the Digitisation of Cradock 4 Inquest Documentation https://www.ru.ac.za/latestnews/rhodesuniversityhelpsbringshistorytothepresentthroughthedigitisationo.html accessed 30 August 2023        [ Links ]

National Prosecuting Authority 2023 NPA Further Enhances Efforts to Ensure Effective Handling and Prosecution of TRC Cases https://www.npa.gov.za/media/npa-further-enhances-efforts-ensure-effective-handling-and-prosecution-trc-cases accessed 30 August 2023        [ Links ]

Overseas Security Advisory Council 2019 Cameroon 2019 Crime and Safety Report https://www.osac.gov/Country/Cameroon/Content/Detail/Report/b1678858-8009-43c5-9c7b-160eea6972d9 accessed 20 June 2020        [ Links ]

SABC News Online 2015 Understanding Amnesty in South Africa: What Really Happened at the TRC? https://social.shorthand.com/SABCNewsOnline/nyCsx09gnf/understanding-amnesty-in-south-africa accessed 19 April 2021        [ Links ]

Steflja I 2012 Challenges of Transitional Justice in Rwanda https://www.africaportal.org/publications/challenges-of-transitional-justice-in-rwanda/ accessed 25 April 2021        [ Links ]

United Nations International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 2005 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/D2867CFA4E80B979C1256FC4005209FC-ici-sud-25feb.pdf accessed 28 April 2021        [ Links ]

List of Abbreviations

ANC African National Congress

Fordham Int'l LJ Fordham International Law Journal

Harv Hum Rts J Harvard Human Rights Journal

Hum Rts Q Human Rights Quarterly

ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

IDPs Internally Displaced Persons

ILSA J Int'l & Comp L ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law

JAL Journal of African Law

JICJ Journal of International Criminal Justice

JMAS Journal of Modern African Studies

LJIL Leiden Journal of International Law

NPA National Prosecuting Authority

OSAC Overseas Security Advisory Council

PELJ Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal

SABC South African Broadcasting Corporation

SACJ South African Journal of Criminal Justice

Tex Int'l LJ Texas International Law Journal

TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission

U Kan L Rev University of Kansas Law Review

YIHL Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law

 

 

Date Submitted: 21 February 2023
Date Revised: 1 March 2024
Date Accepted: 1 March 2024
Date Published: 21 June 2024

 

 

Section Editor: Prof H Chitimira
Journal Editor: Prof C Rautenbach
* Derrick Teneng Cho. LLB (Hons) (Uni of Buea) Masters I and LLM (Uni of Yaoundé II) LLD (NWU). Post doctoral fellow at the Research Chair in Cities, Law and Environmental Sustainability (CLES), North-West University, South Africa. Email: choderrickteneng@yahoo.com. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6094-915X.
1 Orentlicher 2007 International Journal of Transitional Justice 12-13; Malamud-Goti 1990 Hum Rts Q 5.
2 Societies transitioning from periods of gross human rights violations, usually perpetrated by a dictatorial regime.
3 In the South African case the conflict was between the Blacks (predominantly) and the Whites; in Rwanda, between the Hutus, and the Tutsis; and in Cameroon, between the Anglophones, and the Francophones.
4 See generally the following: Human Rights Watch 2018 https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/cameroon0718_web2.pdf; International Crisis Group 2017 https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/250-cameroons-anglophone-crisis-at-the-crossroads_0.pdf; Amnesty International 2018 https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR1784812018ENGLISH.PDF.
5 Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997 JMAS 220-228.
6 See generally Achankeng 2015 The Round Table 104 319-340; Pineteh 2005 Journal of Intercultural Studies 379-399; Konings "Anglophone University Students" 163-190.
7 Pommerolle and Heungoup 2017 African Affairs 532.
8 Cameroon-info.net 2016 http://www.cameroon-info.net/article/cameroun-honorable-joseph-wirba-depute-du-bui-ceux-qui-affirment-que-le-cameroundoit-277266.html.
9 Dionne 2018 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/world/africa/cameroon-election-biya-ambazonia.html.
10 Battalion d'Intervention Rapide.
11 Human Rights Watch 2019 https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/28/cameroon-new-attacks-civilians-troops-separatists.
12 The name "Ambazonia" comes from a Portuguese appellation of Southern Cameroon: see Dinka "New Social Order" 91-105.
13 Cho and Agbor 2022 PELJ 5.
14 Human Rights Watch 2019 https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/22/cameroon-security-forces-kill-civilians-rape-woman.
15 See generally Cho and Agbor 2022 Journal of Nation-Building and Policy Studies 529.
16 These lockdowns were imposed on the population by the separatist leaders in order to make the Anglophone regions ungovernable.
17 Longari 2018 https://www.france24.com/en/20190911 -cameroonian-president-biya-national-dialogue-anglophone-separatists.
18 Act Alliance 2019 https://reliefweb.int/report/cameroon/act-alliance-appeal-cameroon-conflict-emergency-cmr191 7.
19 OSAC 2019 https://www.osac.gov/Country/Cameroon/Content/Detail/Report/b1678858-8009-43c5-9c7b-160eea6972d9 2; Amnesty International 2018 https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR1784812018ENGLISH.PDF 8.
20 Cho and Agbor 2022 PELJ 5.
21 Agbor and Njeassam 2019 PELJ 3.
22 The violence seems to changed the motto of the Southern Cameroons National Council, which was previously "The force of argument, not the argument of force".
23 Teitel 2003 Harv Hum Rts J 69.
24 Teitel 2003 Fordham Intl LJ 893.
25 Brankovic 2014 https://www.csvr.org.za/african-union-transitional-justice-policy-framework-in-practice-implementing-accountability-measures/.
26 Kim and Hong 2019 Journal of Conflict Resolution 1165-1192.
27 Legide 2021 Journal of African Conflicts and Peace Studies 8.
28 Kim and Hong 2019 Journal of Conflict Resolution 1165.
29 Kim and Hong 2019 Journal of Conflict Resolution 1165-1192.
30 Noteworthy are laws such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 55 of 1949; the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950; the Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950; the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 49 of 1953; the Public Safety Act 3 of 1953; the Immorality Act 23 of 1957; the Terrorism Act 83 of 1967; and the Unlawful Organisations Act 34 of 1960.
31 For details on the apartheid laws, see: Berrisford 2011 Urban Forum 247-263; Dubow Apartheid, 1948-1994 32-99.
32 See Art 1 of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973); Art 7(1)(j) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998).
33 Van der Merwe and Chapman Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa 6.
34 Van der Merwe and Chapman Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa 6.
35 Van der Merwe and Chapman Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa 6.
36 Van der Merwe and Chapman Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa 8.
37 The term "Ubuntu" is generally understood to connote the phrase: "I am because we are".
38 Tutu No Future without Forgiveness 30.
39 Section 3(1)(a) of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
40 Section 3(1)(b) of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
41 Section 3(1)(c) of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
42 Byrne 2004 Peace and Conflict 237-256.
43 Section 28 of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. Also see TRC Report Volume 1 paras 42-47, 48-51 addressing the activities of the Investigation Unit and the Research Department respectively.
44 Van der Merwe and Chapman Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa 9.
45 See generally Hamber Transforming Societies; Allan and Allan 2000 Behavioural Science and the Law 459-477.
46 See SABC 2015 https://social.shorthand.com/SABCNewsOnline/nyCsx09gnf/understanding-amnesty-in-south-africa.
47 Stevens 2005 African Safety Promotion 23-39.
48 Gibson 2006 Journal of Conflict Resolution 416.
49 Gibson 2006 Journal of Conflict Resolution 416.
50 Backer 2005 Journal of the International Institute.
51 See generally De Greiff Handbook of Reparations; Lykes and Mersky "Reparations and Mental Health" 589-622.
52 Moyo 2022 https://www.ru.ac.za/latestnews/rhodesuniversityhelpsbringshistorytothepresentthroughthedigitisationo.html.
53 These include the various legal prohibitions and discriminations that were instituted against black people.
54 See Merten 2021 https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-16-amending-constitutions-section-25-draws-to-a-close-but-eff-makes-last-stand-for-nationalisation/. Also see Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Tafira "Land Question in South Africa" 135.
55 See, for example, UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 2005 https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/D2867CFA4E80B979C1256FC4005209FC-ici-sud-25feb.pdf.
56 See UN Committee against Torture: Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations, South Africa UN Doc CAT/C/ZAF/CO/1 (2006) para 18.
57 In November 2022 the NPA contemplated reopening investigations on some TRC cases. 64 key matters have been registered for investigation, with the appointment of 25 prosecutors and 40 investigators. See NPA 2023 https://www.npa.gov.za/media/npa-further-enhances-efforts-ensure-effective-handling-and-prosecution-trc-cases.
58 See, for example, AZAPO v Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1996 8 BCLR 1015 (CC); The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd v McBride 2011 8 BCLR 816 (CC).
59 See Baines 1998 Mots Pluriels 1-10; Jablonski, Blum and Friedman Colour of Our Future 12.
60 Ntoubandi Amnesty for Crimes against Humanity 151-183; Schabas 2004 UC Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 145; Scharf 1996 Tex Int'l LJ 1.
61 Gahima Transitional Justice in Rwanda 128.
62 Some sources say 800,000 people were killed, while to others it was approximately one million: see Ingelaere "Gacaca Courts in Rwanda" 29-30 (affirming that approximately 800,000 people were killed); Kagame Preface to Kaufman and Clark After Genocide xxi (claims that one million people died).
63 Graybill and Lanegran 2004 African Studies Quarterly 8.
64 Schabas "Post-Genocide Justice in Rwanda" 207, 212.
65 About 120,000 suspects were arrested and detained pending trial: see Jones Courts of Genocide 83-84; Sarkin 2001 JAL 144.
66 For details regarding the shortcomings of the initial national prosecution strategy see Gahima Transitional Justice in Rwanda 129-136.
67 Schabas "Post-Genocide Justice in Rwanda" 209.
68 Schabas "Post-Genocide Justice in Rwanda" 208.
69 Nagy "Traditional Justice" 92.
70 Ingelaere "Gacaca Courts in Rwanda" 35.
71 Article 3 of the UN Security Council Resolution 955: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda UN DOC S/RES/955 (1994).
72 Jones Courts of Genocide 185.
73 Ingelaere "Gacaca Courts in Rwanda" 38.
74 For details, see Palmer 2020 LJIL 789-807; Trouille 2016 JICJ 195-217; Schabas 2003 JICJ 39-63.
75 Articles 14, 19, 21 of the UN Security Council Resolution 955: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda UN Doc S/RES/955 (1994).
76 ICTR 2008 https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/directive-assignment-defence-counsel_en_fr.pdf.
77 ICTR 2008 https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/directive-assignment-defence-counsel_en_fr.pdf.
78 Jones Courts of Genocide 185.
79 Jones Courts of Genocide 185.
80 Jones Courts of Genocide 185.
81 See generally Steflja 2012 https://www.africaportal.org/publications/challenges-of-transitional-justice-in-rwanda/.
82 UN Security Council Resolution 977: Designation of Arusha as the Seat of the International Tribunal for Rwanda UN Doc S/RES/977 (1995).
83 See Ingelaere "Gacaca Courts in Rwanda" 51.
84 Gacaca courts initially dealt with private local matters related to land, marriage, cattle, loans and property, before they were modernised and their jurisdiction was expanded to deal with genocide cases: see generally Kavuro 2017 SACJ 38-71. Also see Reyntjens 1990 Politique Africaine 40; De Jonge Interim Report.
85 Organic Law Establishing the Organisation, Competence and Functioning of Gacaca Courts Charged with Prosecuting and Trying the Perpetrators of the Crime of Genocide and Other Crimes against Humanity, Committed between October 11990 and December 31 1994 Organic Law No 16/2004 of 2004, as modified by Organic Law No 28/2006 of 2006 (hereafter Gagaca Organic Law).
86 Lin 2005 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 76.
87 Kavuro 2017 SACJ 43.
88 The Preamble, read together with Arts 1 and 30 of the Gacaca Organic Law provided for the adherence of the Rwandan penal code of criminal proceedings.
89 See, for example, the following cases: The Prosecutor v Paul Bisengimana (Judgment and Sentence) 2006 ICTR 00-60-T paras 132, 145-150; The Prosecutor v Vincent Rutaganira (Judgment and Sentence) 2005 ICTR-95-1C-T para 149.
90 Kavuro "Rwanda Reconciliation Process" 3.
91 Lin 2005 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 76.
92 Kavuro 2017 SACJ 43.
93 The Preamble, read together with Arts 1 and 30 of the Gacaca Organic Law provided for adherence to the Rwandan penal code of criminal proceedings.
94 See, for example, the following cases The Prosecutor v Paul Bisengimana (Judgment and Sentence) 2006 ICTR 00-60-T paras 132, 145-150; The Prosecutor v Vincent Rutaganira (Judgment and Sentence) 2005 ICTR-95-1C-T para 149.
95 Westberg 2010 U Kan L Rev 351.
96 Westberg 2010 U Kan L Rev 351.
97 Westberg 2010 U Kan L Rev 352.
98 Kavuro 2017 SACJ 70.
99 Human Rights Watch 2011 https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/05/31/justice-compromised/legacy-rwandas-community-based-gacaca-courts 36. Also see Mibenge 2004 YIHL 417; Amnesty International 2010 https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr47/005/2010/en/ 15.
100 See Kaliisa Internews Arusha 1.
101 Crawford Hirondelle News Agency Lausanne 2.
102 Westberg 2010 U Kan L Rev 355.
103 Ingelaere "Gacaca Courts in Rwanda" 38.